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Introduction 
Since the inception of the Uruguay Round of the GA TT, research focusing on modelling 
agricultural trade issues has been an important activity for many economists (e.g. Tyers and 
Anderson, 1992). The dominant characteristic of this research has been the measurement of the 
costs of agricultural support policies and the identification of the likely beneficiaries and losers 
from agricultural policy reform. However, a problem with much of this research has been the 
failure to incorporate imperfect competition into the modelling of policy reform. 
To some extent this has been redressed in recent computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
modelling work which, by explicitly identifying a role for the food processing sector, has enabled 
a fuller specification of industry characteristics, i.e. there is a role for economies of scale, product 
differentiation, free entry and exit and strategic interaction (see Hertel, 1994). In such an 
environment, agricultural policy reform can generate gains in excess of standard partial 
equilibrium models, not just due to the general equilibrium effects, but also due to the fact that 
trade reform can give rise to pro-competitive effects because of changes in market structure. 
Despite these recent improvements, a feature common to assessments of agricultural trade 
policy has been the tendency to assume that all forms of intervention have the same effect on 
domestic prices. Thus, divergences between world and domestic prices are treated in ad valorem 
form, allowing different forms of intervention to be collapsed into aggregate measures such as 
producer/consumer subsidy equivalents. If perfect competition is assumed, this does not create 
a problem, however, if markets are imperfectly competitive, the distinction between policy 
instruments does matter, as certain instruments, such as import quotas, can affect firms' strategic 
behavior. 
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The focus of this paper is on applying recent theoretical developments in the international 
trade literature that have explicitly examined the effect of different trade policy instruments where 
markets are oligopolistic. It is shown that an import quota permitting the same level of imports 
that would enter under a corresponding tariff, can have a very different outcome relative to the 
tariff policy. This issue is discussed with reference to the recent, and on-going, policy debate 
regarding changes to the European Community's (EC) banana import regime, where the markets 
in member states are dominated by a small number of firms. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 1 outlines the structure of trade in food and agricultural products, and briefly describes 
the structure of the food processing sector. Section 2 reviews the literature on the tariff-quota 
(non-) equivalence issue and the role that market structure may play in influencing the outcome. 
Section 3 specifies a general conjectural variations model that captures the anticipated effects of 
tariffs and quotas in oligopolistic settings. Section 4 evaluates the effects of tariffs and quotas 
on banana imports by one EC member state (Germany), while Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes. 
1. Trade and Market Structure in Food Processing 
While agricultural trade modelling has generally ignored issues of market structure, it is not the 
case that agricultural economists have always assumed perfectly competitive markets. For 
example, a series of papers, starting with McCalla (1966), and including, among others, Alaouze 
et al. (1978), and Thursby and Thursby (1990), has focused on imperfect competition in the 
world wheat market. Also, recent research by Karp and Perloff (1989, 1993) has examined the 
extent of international oligopoly in the rice and coffee markets. 
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The key departure in this literature has been the recognition of the existence of either 
government or state trading organizations in international trade. This, however, still ignores the 
markets for high-value food products where private firms are the main participants. There are 
two reasons why it is relevant to focus on these markets. First, a large and increasing proportion 
of international trade in the food and agricultural sector is not in bulk commodities (such as 
cereals) but in high-value food products. Handy and Henderson (1994) report that, in 1990, the 
value of world trade in processed food products1 exceeded $205 billion, a figure that is about 
three times as large as the value of world trade in bulk agricultural commodities. 
Second, high-value food products are manufactured and distributed by private firms 
operating in markets that can be described as imperfectly competitive. As shown by Connor et 
al. (1985), and Sutton (1991), the food processing industries in both the US and EC do tend to 
have imperfectly competitive market structures characterized by high seller concentration, some 
degree of plant level economies of scale, and product differentiation. For example, Sutton 
(op.cit.) reports that the cross-industry, cross-country four-firm sales concentration ratios for the 
period 1987-88 were, on average, 65% for the food processing sector. Generally, the food 
processing industries, in both the US and EC, are dominated by small numbers of firms, 
suggesting that there is potential for strategic interaction. 
In addition, work by Hirschberg et al. (1994), indicates that a good deal of trade in food 
processing is of an intra-industry nature, a pattern which is normally rationalized by appeal to 
factors such as imperfect competition, economies of scale and product differentiation (see 
Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Therefore, while it is an empirical matter to establish exactly the 
1 Defined as industries classified into the 2-digit SIC Code 20. 
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degree to which food processing firms are acting less than competitively, it seems reasonable to 
argue that, a priori, given the available evidence, it is important to incorporate industrial 
organization analysis into agricultural trade modelling exercises, particularly the impact of market 
structure on the outcome of trade reform. 
2. Tariffs, Quotas and Firms' Behavior 
Much of the recent trade policy literature that deals with oligopolistic markets has focused on 
tariffs and subsidies as the relevant trade instrument2. However, most trade instruments in the 
agricultural and food sectors consist of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as import quotas. 
MacBean (1989) has shown that, in the 1980s, over 40 percent of total agricultural imports by 
developed countries were affected by some sort of NTB. For example, the dairy industry in the 
US is protected by a system of import quotas (see Anderson, 1985), likewise, the EC sugar 
regime (see Harris et al., 1983). Hence, it is imp9rtant, in considering policy reform in the food 
and agricultural sectors, to understand the consequences of using quantity constraints and to 
compare these with the effects of instruments such as tariffs. 
The early literature on the equivalence3 between tariffs and quotas as alternative trade 
policy instruments considered two extremes of market structure in the importing country; perfect 
competition and monopoly (see Bhagwati, 1965, 1968; and Shibata, 1968). The upshot of this 
research was to show that market structure matters since, given that the quota-induced demand 
curve facing the domestic monopolist lies below the initial demand curve, domestic prices will 
2 See for example. Brander and Spencer (1985). 
3 'Equivalence' relates to the effect on domestic prices when the level of imports permitted with a quota is the 
same as that due to a tariff. 
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be higher with a quota relative to a tariff, te. tariffs and quotas are non-equivalent under 
monopoly. 
More recent literature has considered the tariff-quota issue in intermediate cases, i.e. 
where markets are oligopolistic. For example, Harris (1985), and Krishna (1989) analyze the 
effects of quantitative restraints when firms play a game in price. The seminal paper by Krishna 
(op.cit.) illustrates the non-equivalence argument most starkly4• Consider Figure 1, RFt and RF2 
represent the usual reaction functions in a price game where the products are strategic 
complements, and N is the initial Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Taking a demand function, and 
assuming a quota is imposed on firm 2 at x2, this constraint binds at prices Pt and p2 if: 
(1) 
This implicitly defines the price p2 that will just satisfy the quota constraint given firm 1 's price 
p1, i.e. p2 = f(p1,xJ. The set of prices that will satisfy the quota constraint is given by the line 
x2x2 in the figure. This line lies to the left of the unconstrained equilibrium as the quota, by 
definition, is more restrictive. It is also upward-sloping because if firm 1 increases its price, firm 
2 must raise its price in order to satisfy the constraint. At points to the right of x2x2, firm 2's 
price is lower than that necessary to be consistent with the quota constraint, and hence the quota 
constraint is binding. At points to the left of x2x2, the quota constraint is not binding. So firm 
2's reaction function is the line denoted b8X2• To illustrate, suppose that finn 1 charges Pt and 
firm 2 charges p2, demand for firm 2's processed product will exceed the constraint. It is 
4 The key difference between these papers is that while Krishna maintains a simultaneous-move game, Harris 
assumes that a quota turns the domestic and foreign finns into Stackelberg leader and follower respectively. 
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assumed that costless arbitrage occurs whereby consumers of firm 2' s good who are able to 
purchase at p2, re-sell at a higher price that clears the market'. 
Figure 1 
,., ,., (P1 ,P1 ) 
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Given firm 2' s reaction function under the quota constraint, firm 1 's reaction function is 
considered in Figure 2. Define two price combinations: (p~,pD where firm 1 's iso-profit contour 
x; is just tangent to the quota constraint at g, and (p~ ,pi) where 11:; intersects firm 1 's reaction 
function at h. If firm 2 sets a price P2 > p~, then firm 1 is unaffected by firm 2' s quota 
constraint as it can sell at a price along its reaction function hi which generates profits in excess 
of x;. If p2 < p~. firm 1 will set its price at p~ which is consistent with firm 2's constraint. If 
p2 = p~, finn 1 is indifferent between setting p~ and Pi, as it can obtain 7t; at either price level. 
5 Tirole (1989) refers to this as an 'efficient' rationing rule, as it maximizes consumer SW"plus. 
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Consequently, firm l's reaction function is discontinuous between the points hand j, and 
so never intersects firm 2's reaction function. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies 
does not exist6• As Krishna (ibid) shows, a mixed strategy equilibrium does exist where finn 
2 charges p~ while firm 1 randomizes over the prices p~ and p~. In the mixed strategy 
equilibrium, finn 2' s expected profits rise to the level associated with p~, while those of firm 1 
rise to 1t;. Also, as these prices exceed those at the initial Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the output 
of both firms is likely to fall. In addition, these effects are not equivalent to those under a tariff. 
The tariff-equivalent to the quota would be at point T, where the foreign firm's reaction function 
has been shifted up by the amount of the tariff. Clearly, equilibrium prices are lower here than 
under the quota. 
6 A quota restriction here is like a capacity constraint, and, since Edgeworth (1925), it has been known that 
capacity constraints in a Bertrand game will not result in a pure strategy equilibrium. 
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However, it turns out that this result is sensitive to the assumption that firms play a game 
in price. Specifically, Fung (1989) has shown that if firms play Nash in quantities, and the goods 
are strategic substitutes, tariffs and quotas are equivalent. While this result is not shown in detail 
here, it does illustrate a dilemma for empirical research. Specifically, imposing a particular form 
of oligopolistic interaction on an international market may result in the incorrect evaluation of 
an NTB 's impact. 
A possible solution to the problem can be found in the work of Hwang and Mai (1988). 
They show that in a general conjectural variations model, quantitative restraints can generate 
either pro- or anti-competitive effects, or neither, depending on the initial values of the firms' 
conjectures, i.e. how (un)competitive the market was prior to the imposition of the quota. In 
their duopoly model, a quota effectively imposes Cournot behavior on the home firm, i.e. the 
home firm now knows that if it changes its output, the foreign firm's output cannot change, 
presuming the quota is binding, which is effectively identical to what is assumed under Coumot 
behavior. Hence, if the firm was initially playing more (less) competitively than Cournot, then 
a quota will make the market less (more) competitive. In this context, the quota can have either 
pro- or anti-competitive effects. In the case where firms initially play Cournot, the quota has no 
effect on firms' behavior, and, thus, the tariff and quota are equivalent (the Fung result). 
In sum, when markets are oligopolistic, tariffs and quotas are likely to be non-equivalent 
since quotas affect firms' behavior while tariffs do not. Consequently, when modelling 
imperfectly competitive markets, dealing with alternative trade policy instruments in ad valorem 
form ignores a potentially important effect of trade policy intervention. How important this issue 
is and what influences the degree of non-equivalence is explored in the remainder of the paper. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
(a) Basic Model 
The model of oligopoly used here, and subsequently applied to the German banana 
market, is a standard model of differentiated oligopoly utilized by, among others, Dixit (1988), 
and Cheng (1987). There are two principal reasons for adopting this model: first, it follows a 
general conjectural variations approach so that the effect of quotas on firms' conjectures can be 
considered; second, following Dixit (1987), the model can be used to generate an empirical 
assessment of the effect of trade policies. 
The structure of the market is divided into two where dominant firm(s) compete with 
fringe firms in the domestic market, although there is no domestic production. The dominant 
firm(s) output is denoted by subscript 1, fringe output by subscript 2. Consumer surplus is given 
by: 
(2) 
where the utility function f(Q1,<6) is defined as: 
(3) 
These functional forms generate the following inverse demand functions: 
P1 = a1 - bi Qi - k Q2 (4) 
(5) 
where all the parameters are positive, p1 and p2 are prices, Q1 and ~ are quantities and b1 b2 - k2 
;::: 0 indicates the extent to which dominant and fringe goods are imperfect substitutes. 
On the supply side, there are ~ symmetric-sized firms in the dominant and fringe sectors. 
Since in the empirical example to follow the market is characterized by the dominance of 
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multinational firms, it is assumed that profits are repatriated abroad. Thus, profits do not enter 
the domestic welfare function. Firms' costs are assumed constant. Profits for a representative 
finn in each sector are given by: 
(6) 
(7) 
where c1 and fi are marginal and fixed costs respectively and t is a tariff. Since there are ni firms 
in each sector, such that aggregate output can be given by Q(= niqJ, the first-order conditions 
for profit maximization are: 
P -c -t-QV =0 1 1 1 1 (8) 
P -c-t-QV=O 2 2 2 2 (9) 
where the aggregate conjectural variation parameters V1 are explicitly given by: 
V 1 = [D11 {1 + (n1 - l)v11 } + D21n2v12 ]/n1 (10) 
(11) 
where Di (i = 1,2) are the partial derivatives (8pi I 8QJ with respect to dominant and fringe finn 
produced goods, and vu (i = 1,2) are the firms' conjectures about how dominant and fringe 
competitors will respond to a change in quantities. The values for the vii's are continuous 
variables whose values capture a range of possibilities concerning firm behavior. For example, 
if the dominant and fringe firms play Cournot strategies, then all vu's will equal zero; hence the 
values of V1 and V2 will equal D! I n1 and Di I n2 respectively. For conduct more competitive 
(less competitive) than Coumot, vii< 0 (vii> 0). In the limit, vii= -1, the competitive outcome, 
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or Vu = 1, the collusive outcome. Clearly firms can hold different conjectures about their 
competitors in the dominant and fringe sectors. 
Equilibrium prices and quantities are obtained by combining (4), (5), (8) and (9) to give: 
(12) 
(13) 
(b) Effects of a Quota 
The effect of an import quota can be broken down into two parts: an ad valorem effect 
and a firm behavioral effect. The ad valorem effect acts like the tariff since, for the same 
quantity of imports, consumer prices will rise. Thus, from expression (13), it can be readily 
shown that differentiating p1 and p2 with respect to t: 
dpl dp2 
-+-->0 (14) 
dt dt 
i.e. domestic prices rise when a tariff is imposed. However, as Hwang and Mai suggest, a quota 
can change finns' behavior which, in this model, is characterized by a change in firms' 
conjectures. Thus, if the quota affects all firms (which is the case in the particular example to 
follow), then, for a given tariff, it can be shown that there will be an additional effect on prices: 
12 
>0 (15) 
The direction of change in p1 and p2 will depend on the initial value of firms' conjectures. 
If all firms were initially playing Cournot (i.e. v11 = v12 = v21 = v22 = 0) then tariffs and quotas 
would be equivalent since there would be no change in firms' conjectures induced by the quota. 
However, if the conjectures initially differed from zero (i.e. vw v12, Vw v22 ~ 0), then tariffs and 
quotas would be non-equivalent since the quota now has the additional effect of making the 
conjectures take the Cournot value. Of course, each of the conjectures could initially be positive 
or negative (e.g. vw v12 > 0 and v21 , v22 < 0 or any other combination), then the net effect will 
be the sum of the subsequent changes'. Also, inspection of the firms' first-order conditions (8) 
and (9), and the conjectural variations expressions (10) and (11) indicates that firms' output under 
the quota, and hence prices, will vary not only in the initial values of the Vu terms but also the 
number of firms ni, and the demand parameters bi and k. In terms of the calibration of this 
model, the demand parameters will be affected by the values chosen for the elasticities of demand 
and substitution, e and a respectively. 
In terms of domestic welfare, therefore, quotas can exacerbate or off set the effects of 
tariffs. However, there is one additional consideration. With tariffs, there can be 'rent-shifting' 
effects, where rents are shifted form foreign to home firms8• In most models, this relies on 
sufficiently strong terms of trade effects, though in the example to follow, it could arise if the 
7 Of course, it is possible that even with initial conjectures being different from zero, the pro- and anti-
competitive effects could cancel each other. 
8 See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for a discussion of the rent-shifting effects of trade policy instruments. 
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government collects tariff revenue from the dominant and fringe firms (since neither of these are 
domestic producers). Thus defining welfare to be the sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue 
on all imports (Q1 and ~. then it is possible that: 
dW > O 
dt 
(16) 
However, with quantitative restraints, unless the quota licenses are auctioned, the quota rent 
would not be retained domestically. In this case, domestic welfare (now defined only as 
consumer surplus) falls. 
4. Empirical Assessment 
(a) Methodology 
The empirical results presented below are derived using a computable partial equilibrium 
model based on the theoretical framework outlined. As details of this technique are discussed 
elsewhere (Dixit, 1987), a full outline of the procedure is not presented here. Essentially, 
calibrating this system involves using estimates of the elasticity of demand e, the elasticity of 
substitution cr, and observations on prices, quantities and costs so that the parameters are 
consistent with equilibrium in any given period. Once this is done, the effects of policy changes 
can be derived by using equations (12) and (13), the changes in consumer surplus being found 
by using equation (2). 
(b) Application 
This methodology is applied to the German banana market. The rationale for focusing 
on bananas, and the German market in particular, is twofold. The key feature of the world 
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banana export industry is the dominance of three multinational firms - United Brands (Chiquita), 
Standard Fruit (Dole), and Del Monte (see Read, 1983). Between them, these three firms account 
for 70 percent of the world market and 66 percent of the European market, United Brands alone 
accounting for 43 percent (Hallam and McConiston, 1992). In individual EC states, markets are 
also highly concentrated. For example, in Germany, three firms (United Brands, Standard Fruit 
and Noboa) account for 72 percent of the market In addition, product differentiation through 
branding is a key feature of the retailing of bananas. For example, United Brands are reported 
to be able to sell their Chiquita brand at a price on average between 30 to 40 percent higher than 
its unbranded bananas (European Commission, 197 6). Further evidence of possible market power 
in the EC is given by the European Commission's 1976 and 1992 rulings against United Brands 
that it had abused its dominant market position. 
Second, while Germany is the only EC member state that has operated a free market 
system in banana trade, since the end of 1992, reform of the EC banana import regime, designed 
to harmonize internal EC banana prices, has led to Germany having to implement trade 
restrictions on its banana imports9• 
The model described in Section 3 was calibrated with the most recent available German 
banana data for 1991. The relevant price, quantity and elasticity data were derived from FAQ 
Banana Statistics (1992), Borrell and Yang (1992), and Islam and Subramian (1989) respectively; 
9 While Gennany has operated a regime of free trade in bananas, countries such as France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom have maintained restrictions on imports from so-called Dollar countries (e.g. Columbia and Ecuador etc.) 
in order to ensure high prices for preferential suppliers of bananas from the African, Caribbean and Pacific states. 
As a result there has been wide variation in retail banana prices across the Community, which would be unsustainable 
. under the EC's 1992 Single Market process. The policy that was actually introduced in December 1992 was a 
combination of tariffs and quotas. For the first 2 million tonnes, bananas will enter the EC at a reduced duty, 
thereafter, the tariff rises to a prohibitive 170 percent. For more detailed discussion of the debate over the EC's 
banana import regime, see: Borrell and Yang (1990, 1992), Fitzpatrick and Associates (1990), Hallam and 
McCorriston (1992). 
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p1 = 1491 OM/tonne, p2 = 1228 OM/tonne, Q1 = 542,080 tonnes,~= 813,120 tonnes, e = -0.4, 
and a= 3.0. 
(c) Results 
The EC Commission's policy options varied between tariffs and quotas. In order to 
evaluate the degree of non-equivalence, it is assumed that the EC-wide tariff chosen is 20 percent 
or, alternatively, that the EC imposes quantitative restraints on banana imports at the 20 percent 
tariff-equivalent level10• The results of simulating these policies in the German banana market 
are given in Table 1. When a tariff is imposed, it would reduce German consumers' welfare, 
the estimated reduction here being OM 482.4 million, a reduction of approximately 20 percent. 
Overall welfare for Germany is reduced by this amount even though the 20 percent tariff raises 
revenue; this, however, becomes part of EC budgetary resources. Even if it were retained in 
Germany, welfare shows a small net decline as the loss to consumers from the increase in banana 
prices outweighs the increase in tariff revenue - there are of course no rent-shifting effects here 
as none of the banana firms are German-based. Firms supplying the German market would face 
a reduction in profits of OM 31.5 million. 
Table 1: Eft'ect or Tariff's and Quotas 
on the German Banana Market (DM million) 
Simulation 
Baseline 
Consumer Welfare Firms' Profits Tariff Revenue 
20% Tariff 
20% Tariff 
-Equivalent Quota 
2465.5 
1983.1 
1604.4 
303.8 
272.3 
735.2 
281.2 
10 Effectively, the prohibitive tariff of 170 percent on imports in excess of 2 million tonnes makes the policy a 
binding quota, and the tariff is being used to collect the quota rents. 
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Importantly though, as discussed above, the quota-equivalent policy is likely to have 
different effects since not only will it have an ad valorem effect, but it will also change finns' 
behavior unless they are already playing Cournot. As Table 2 indicates, both the dominant firm 
and the fringe firms (in aggregate) were playing more competitively than Cournot during the 
period of calibration. 
Table 2: E.Uimated Conjectural Variations Parameters 
Actual Coumot-Equivalent 
Dominant Firm (V 1) .00070469 .0056096 
Fringe Firms (VJ .00014635 .00022295 
Therefore, with the imposition of a quota, both sets of firms now play less competitively. 
Domestic prices, therefore, rise by a greater amount than in the tariff case and consumers' 
welfare is reduced further. Table 1 shows that, relative to the baseline, consumer welfare is 
reduced by OM 861.1 million, a reduction of 35 percent. Further, unless the quota licenses are 
auctioned, quota rents are captured by the supplying firms whose profits now increase by 142 
percent relative to the baseline case and by 170 percent relative to the tariff case. Clearly, at 
least in this example, the non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas is substantial11• 
( d) Sensitivity Analysis 
Clearly the simulated degree of non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas is likely to 
be sensitive to the values of the elasticities used to calibrate the model. In common with most 
calibration exercises (e.g. Dixit, 1987), this issue is explored by varying the values for the values 
of the elasticity of demand and elasticity of substitution parameters. The results of this exercise 
11 In their study of protection in the EC car market. Digby et al. (1988) also found that voluntary export restraints 
gave rise to considerable anti-competitive effects. 
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are reported in Table 3, where non-equivalence between the tariff and quota is indexed by the 
percentage difference between prices under the tariff and the tariff-equivalent quota, the prices 
of the dominant and fringe firms having been averaged. The results indicate that as either e or 
cr are increased for constant values of the other, the degree of non-equivalence decreases, i.e. the 
effect of increased product substitutability and price elasticity of demand tempers the effects of 
firms acting less competitively under a quota. In particular, the degree of non-equivalence 
declines rapidly for increases in the elasticity of demand, suggesting that the inelastic demand 
for bananas significantly affects the policy outcome between tariffs and quotas. These results 
highlight the importance of doing sensitivity analysis when conducting policy simulations of this 
type. 
5. Summary 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analys~ for Degree of 
Non-Equivalence between Tariffs and Quotas1 
Elasticity of Substitution cr 
0.4 
Elasticity of Demand e 1.0 
1.5 
1.5 
39.3 
9.7 
3.6 
2.0 
33.2 
6.2 
2.1 
3.0 
26.52 
4.9 
0.5 
1 Percentage difference between tariff and quota prices, averaged over 
the dominant and fringe firms. 
2 This is the degree of non-equivalence derived in the simulation. 
This paper has focused on how of market structure can affect the outcome of trade policy. While 
there have been some recent attempts to deal with market structure issues in agricultural trade 
policy analysis, there has, as yet, been little discussion of the effects of alternative trade policy 
instruments. It has been shown that quantitative restraints in oligopolistic markets are likely to 
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have different effects relative to the equivalent level of imports induced by a tariff. The reason 
for this is that a quantitative measure will likely change firms' behavior while a tariff will leave 
it unchanged. 
This issue was explored in the context of the changes proposed to the EC' s banana market 
regime. In the empirical assessment of trade measures applied to the German market, it was 
shown that the anti-competitive effects would outweigh the ad valorem and tariff revenue (if 
applicable) effects. However, it may be possible that pro-competitive effects could be the 
dominant feature in other case-studies. In sum, in analyzing the effect of trade policy in 
oligopolistic environments, it is necessary to take account of the trade instrument used. Focusing 
just on ad valorem equivalents may not capture the whole story. 
Finally, while this paper has emphasized the importance of capturing market structure in 
trade policy modelling, the analysis is characterized by a weakness of virtually all empirical work 
on industrial organization and trade, the use of conjectural variations to measure oligopolistic 
interaction. Conjectural variations have long been regarded as an unsatisfactory way of 
modelling oligopoly, the standard objection being that they represent an attempt to impose 
dy~amic interaction of firms on a single-period game (Friedman, 1977; Tirole, op.cit.). A static 
game, by definition, cannot allow firms to react to one another, so the notion of firms having 
beliefs about their rivals' reactions is unsatisfactory. In addition, as Dixit (1988) has pointed out, 
when conducting comparative statics exercises with calibration models, the conjectural variations 
parameters tend to be fixed irrespective of the policy instrument used. 
While the analysis presented in this paper attempts to deal with the latter problem by 
adjusting the conjectural variations parameters in response to the use of import controls, this still 
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does not get around the general problem raised by theorists about using conjectural variations. 
Although recent theoretical work by Dockner (1992) indicates that perhaps a conjectural 
variations equilibrium does capture dynamic interactions. Using a linear-quadratic structure, 
Dockner shows that a steady-state closed-loop equilibrium for a dynamic game can be viewed 
as a conjectural variations equilibrium of the corresponding static game, and, therefore, 
conjectural variations may be a reasonable approximation in empirical work. 
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